Respectfully Saylor is wrong here on quantum. Specifically, he is wrong on four claims (I'm only focusing on the technical ones). Let me walk through each one. Claim 1: The consensus of the cyber security community is that quantum is not a threat for the next 10 years and thus no immediate action is needed. There is no such consensus. The opposite is true: every major national security and standards body in the world is actively mandating post-quantum migration right now, because the migrations themselves take a decade or more. NSA CNSA 2.0 requires all new National Security Systems to be quantum-safe before 2035 with most of that work being done in the next 5. NIST published finalized PQC standards (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) in August 2024 and released IR 8547 setting a target to deprecate all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallow completely by 2035. The UK NCSC set migration milestones for 2028, 2031, and 2035. These are not responses to a distant hypothetical. These are programs with compliance deadlines because the organizations that set them have concluded that starting now is barely early enough. Historically, it has taken a long time from the moment that a new algorithm is standardized until it is fully integrated into information systems. Past cryptographic migrations confirm this. The SHA-1 deprecation took about 7 years. The AES migration took around 5 years. The TLS 1.3 rollout took 3-5 years despite offering clear performance benefits. NIST has already concluded that PQC migration is fundamentally more complex than any of these precedents. The timeline argument ignores harvest-now-decrypt-later entirely. Adversaries are collecting encrypted data today for future decryption. The U.S. Federal Reserve published an analysis of this in September 2025, using Bitcoin as a case study. The threat is already active. Claim 2: When quantum hits, everything upgrades; banks, the internet, defense, Bitcoin. The internet is already upgrading. 52% of human web traffic on Cloudflare used post-quantum key exchange by December 2025, nearly doubling from 29% at the start of the year. Chrome ships ML-KEM for TLS. Apple enabled PQ TLS in iOS 26. OpenSSH has defaulted to post-quantum key agreement since version 9.0. Signal has post-quantum encryption. AWS and Google Cloud support PQC in their KMS products. Apple added ML-DSA and ML-KEM to CryptoKit as production APIs. Banks and payment networks are centralized. Visa pushes a firmware update or SWIFT changes a protocol spec. TLS upgrades are invisible to end users (if you use Chrome you use a TLS version that supports post-quantum and you didn't even know). These systems can and will migrate without their customers doing anything. Bitcoin cannot do this. Bitcoin requires a fork with global decentralized consensus. A PQC signature migration is categorically harder than previous forks: ML-DSA-44 signatures are 2,420 bytes versus 64 bytes for Schnorr, a 38x increase that breaks Bitcoin's existing SegWit weight economics, Script stack limits (520-byte maximum), and transaction propagation assumptions. A single ML-DSA-44 signature plus public key is several times larger than an entire typical single-input P2WPKH spend today. BIP-360 and QBIP exist as (great) proposals. Sadly, neither has an activation timeline. Enterprise PQC migration is much easier. These are organizations with executive authority to mandate changes, dedicated security teams, and established procurement processes. Bitcoin has none of these. Blockchain governance is structurally slower than centralized governance. The "everything upgrades together" framing also ignores the permanently exposed key problem. When banks upgrade TLS, old sessions don't matter, they were ephemeral. When Bitcoin upgrades, the ~6.9 million BTC with already-exposed public keys on the immutable ledger are still sitting there. You cannot un-publish a public key from a blockchain. Those coins need to be actively moved by their owners to new quantum-safe addresses. Approximately 1.72 million BTC in P2PK addresses, including Satoshi's estimated 1.1 million BTC, are likely permanently exposed because the private keys are lost. There is no banking equivalent to this. Banks do not maintain a public, permanent, immutable record of every customer's authentication key going back 17 years. ...